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Attacking the Empire’s Achilles Heels: 
Railroads and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia*
On November 27, 2009 the Russian public was shocked by a bomb attack on a high speed 
passenger train on its way from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. The incident occurred near 
the town Bologoe, about 320 kilometres north of Moscow. Extremists had planted an ex­
plosive device underneath the railway embankment leaving a crater one meter in diameter 
and damaging one kilometre of track. Four carriages of the “Nevskiy-Express”, which had 
been targeted already in August 2007 by terrorists, came off the rails. Eyewitnesses re­
portedly heard a loud bang before the train derailed at high speed. The accident killed 27 
passengers and left more than 90 injured.1 This attack was just one example of a long line 
of terrorist assaults targeting systems of civil infrastructure in various countries at the be­
ginning of the 21st century.2 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, modern societies be­
came increasingly aware of the vulnerability of their arteries of communication and trans­
portation. The aeroplanes crashing into the towers of the World Trade Centre in 2001, the  
commuter trains exploding in Madrid in March 2004 and in Mumbai in July 2006, and the 
carriages  of  the  London  Underground  being  attacked  by  the  so-called  “backpack­
-bombers” in July 2005 became symbols of the fragility of modern societies in an era of  
increasing human mobility.
The vulnerability of infrastructure systems and the dependence of modern societies on 
their networks of communication and transportation have drawn considerable attention 
both among political scientists and historians.3 Whereas scholars once perceived the con­
struction of national and trans-national systems of civil infrastructure primarily as an in­
dicator of the integration of political, cultural and economic spaces – think of Friedrich 
List’s famous vision of German unification with the help of a national network of rail ­
roads – historians today pay more attention to the fact that the building of railways, tele ­
graph-lines, power grids and the expansion of civil aviation networks also made modern 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the workshop “Terrorism in Pre-Revolutionary 
Russia: New Research and Sources in Europe and the USA“ (November 2007), and on the con­
ference “Terrorism and Modernity: Global Perspectives on Nineteenth Century Political Viol­
ence“ (October 2008), both held at Tulane University, New Orleans. I would like to express my 
gratitude to the participants of these meetings for helpful comments and suggestions. I feel par­
ticularly indebted to David Blackbourn, Oleg Budnitskii,  David Deakin,  Carola Dietze, An­
thony Heywood, Steven Marks, Martin Miller, David Rapoport and Matthew Searle.
1 Derailment of express train rekindles Russian fears; BIDDER Anschlag auf Newski-Express. Rus­
sia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) later accused Alexander Tikhomirov,  an Islamist  rebel 
from Chechnya, who was killed during a raid in Ingushetiya at the beginning of March 2010, of  
bearing responsibility for this terrorist act. Cf. Ingushetia rebel killed in raid by Russian troops.
2 According to “Jane’s Intelligence Review” between 1998 and July 2006 there were at least 74  
separate terrorist attacks on railways worldwide. HINDS Mumbai bombings signal sustained rail 
terrorism trend.
3 LITVINOV/ROZHKOV Bor’ba s terrorizmom; LIEBERMAN / BUCHT Rail Transport Security; MERKI Die 
Verwundbarkeit des modernen Verkehrs.
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societies more vulnerable to external assaults.4 Whereas in 1933 the author of the entry on 
terrorism in the “Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences”  optimistically predicted the de­
cline of politically motivated violence (since “modern technology has made our world so 
complex that we have become increasingly invulnerable to determined actions by indi­
viduals or small groups”5), the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, Mumbai, London 
and Bologoe illustrated the contrary. They unveiled the technical skills of today’s militant 
political activists who make use of the ‘blessings’ of technological development – like 
cell-phones, internet and aviation traffic, and they demonstrated that arteries of modern 
communication (as well  as other sensitive networks like the internet  and power grids) 
have become highly vulnerable Achilles’ heels of 21st century societies.
In this article I argue that the identification of networks of modern infrastructure as tar­
gets of terrorist plots is not an ‘achievement’ of today’s militant political activists at all. In  
fact the first modern terrorist groups, which started their underground warfare in Tsarist 
Russia in the late 1870s, already recognised the terrorizing effects of attacks targeting net ­
works of modern communication like  railroads.6 Analyzing the development of terrorist 
strategies that focussed on sites of modern infrastructure both in Imperial Russia and in 
other countries at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, I will show 
that the construction of railroads not only enabled a significant increase of geographical  
mobility and economic development in the 19th and 20th centuries, thereby contributing 
to the integration of national and trans-national spaces. This new means of transportation 
must also be regarded as one of the prerequisites for the development and spread of mod­
ern terrorism.7 This article understands ‘modern terrorism’ to be a strategy of violent polit­
ical warfare applied by non-state actors working conspiratorially to attack individuals, in­
stitutions, vital national resources or symbolic sites of a political and social order and us­
ing the dissemination of information about their deeds and goals in media of modern mass 
communication to advance their cause. The emergence of modern terrorism, therefore, is a 
phenomenon of the era of ‘high modernity,’ i.e. a product of social and political develop­
ments dating back to the second half of the 19th century.8 
During  the  “Golden  Age  of  Assassination”  (RAPOPORT)  modern  terrorists  tried  to 
achieve their political goals by attacking individuals, especially high ranking political offi­
cials representing the opposed system. Attacks on symbolic sites in public space occupied 
by large numbers of randomly gathered people were subsequently included into the cata­
logue of terrorist strategies. Both in Russia and in other countries that had entered the rail­
way age, railway tracks, stations and train carriages repeatedly became sites of terrorist 
activities, targeting either selected individuals or random groups of men and women. Both 
forms of modern railway terrorism significantly altered modes of perception of public 
space in general and of sites of modern infrastructure like trains and railway stations in  
4 VAN DER VLEUTEN Infrastructures and Societal Change; On the vulnerability of today’s “network 
societies”; cf. special issue of the journal History and Technology 20 (2004) no. 3 and VAN DER 
VLEUTEN Introduction.
5 RAPOPORT Fear and Trembling, p. 3.
6 The literature on the history of railway terrorism is scarce: Cf. VON RÖLL Enzyklopädie des Ei­
senbahnwesens, pp. 183–184, s.v. „Anschläge (Attentate) auf Eisenbahnen“; PREUSS Eisenbahn-
Attentate.
7 On the conceptual history of the terms “terror” and “terrorism”: WALTER Terror.
8 RAPOPORT Four Waves, pp. 3–9. 
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particular. The experience of modern terrorism at these public spaces in the era of techno­
logical progress was part of the ‘modern experience’ and led to the emergence of a new 
sense of personal and social insecurity at these “places of modernity”.9 
* * *
Russia was not among the avant-garde of railroad-building countries in Europe. Except 
for the short railway link between Saint Petersburg and the Tsarist residences of Pavlovsk 
and Tsarskoe Selo, inaugurated in 1837, the Tsarist Empire did not possess any railway 
line  of  national  importance  until  1851,  when  the  railway  link  between  Moscow and 
Petersburg was put into operation. Soon after the defeat in the Crimean War and later in 
the 1890s, however, Russia experienced two major booms of railway building, providing 
the world’s largest  continental empire with the second largest national network of  rail­
roads.10 When Alexander II gave the green light in 1857 to the construction of a railway 
system in European Russia, he primarily regarded this modern means of transportation as 
a tool to strengthen the country’s economic and military might. Throughout the second 
half of the 19th century, the discourse on railway construction was dominated in Russia 
by voices stressing the importance of steam engines and railway tracks for the consolida­
tion of Russia’s territorial integrity. As Mikhail Katkov, an admirer of German railway 
policy, wrote in the newspaper “Moskovskie vedomosti” in 1883, “after the bayonet, it is 
the railways that consummate national cohesion.“11
Already in the early phase of  railroad building, Russian authorities realised that the 
new means of transportation could also be used by opponents of the autocratic and imperi­
al order. The intentional and militant disruption of railway lines first became a political is­
sue during the Polish uprising of January 1863. Recognizing the strategic importance of 
railroads in the western borderlands, the organisers of the national revolt took advantage 
of the regime’s new dependence on this modern means of transportation. Right after the 
outbreak of the rebellion, insurgents burnt wooden railway bridges of the strategically im­
portant Saint Petersburg‒Warsaw line and cut down poles of the railway telegraph. In this 
way they significantly constrained the processes of communication between Tsarist au­
thorities in the Polish Kingdom and in the headquarters in the Russian capital. The Polish  
rebels were also supported by like-minded employees of the privately run railway com­
pany, as Polish railwaymen helped to obstruct the relocation of loyal Tsarist troops from 
Russia to the provinces in turmoil.12 
9 On the term “places/sites of modernity” (Orte der Moderne): GEISTHÖVEL/KNOCH (eds.) Orte der 
Moderne. – The sense of insecurity of human beings making use of systems of modern mass 
transportation was likewise fuelled by the “modern experiences” of the train accident and crim­
inal  acts  in  trains.  Cf.  HARRINGTON Railway Accident;  KILLEN Railway Accidents;  BEAUMONT 
Railway Mania.
10 On  the  history  of  the  railways  in  Tsarist  Russia:  SOLOV’EVA Zheleznodorozhnyy  transport 
Rossii; KRASKOVSKIY/UZDIN (eds.) Istoriya zheleznodorozhnogo transporta Rossii; HAYWOOD Rus­
sia Enters the Railway Age.
11 Moskovskie  vedomosti  (4.8.1883),  cit.:  TVARDOVSKAYA Ideologiya  poreformennogo samoder­
zhaviya, p. 79. English Translation: WORTMAN Scenarios of Power, p. 300.
12 Obshchiy Ustav Rossiyskikh Zheleznykh Dorog, p. 525.
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Yet the attempts of Polish insurgents trying to interrupt rail and telegraph communica­
tion between Tsarist Russia and the Polish Kingdom in 1863 do not fully comply with the 
definition of  modern  terrorism given  above.  The events  of  January 1863 at  the Saint 
Petersburg‒Warsaw railroad are more reminiscent of new strategies of modern warfare in 
the railway age that aim at the destruction of the enemy’s strategic means of communica­
tion and that had been systematically applied for the first time between 1861 and 1865 
during the American Civil  War.13 Nevertheless  the struggle between Polish rebels  and 
Russian authorities over the control of the railroads in the western borderlands confronted 
the Tsarist regime for the first time with the new strategies of political opponents targeting 
the highly sensitive arteries of imperial communication and transportation.
* * *
Two years after the suppression of the January uprising the Tsarist administration was 
alarmed by confidential reports from the western borderlands about a planned assault on 
the Emperor’s train on its way from Warsaw to Moscow. In May 1865 the “Third Section 
of his Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancery” reported on a meeting of Polish subjects in the 
house of a railway guard named Malik where the plan to damage the railway tracks before 
the journey of Alexander II to Moscow had been discussed.14 A few years later an an­
onymous letter alerted the Police of Elizavetgrad to a group of militant political activists 
planning to attack the Emperor’s train on its passage through the city.  In  late summer 
1869, the nameless informant wrote, 
“two young persons settled in [the] […] city with the extremely evil goal of undermining the  
railway and causing an explosion during the passage of the Tsar’s train, but the Tsar changed  
his route, so the efforts of these men were in vain. Yesterday evening someone from Odessa 
came to see them, advising them to create an explosion during the passage of the mail train, 
which act he said might bring in a nice sum of money.”15 
13 BLANK Der Einfluss der Eisenbahn auf die militärische Beweglichkeit; FÖRSTER Wie modern war 
der amerikanische Bürgerkrieg?, p. 177.
14 GARF, f. 109, op. 2a, ed. chr. 788, l. 1–3ob. 
15 POMPER Nechaev and Tsaricide, p. 125. – Armed train robberies, as they were mentioned in the 
anonymous letter, became popular among militant political activists in Russia at the turn of the 
century. Probably the best known action of this kind was committed on September 26, 1908 by 
the “Revolutionary Faction of the Polish Socialist Party” under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski 
at the railway station of Bezdany (Lithuanian: Bezdonys) 25 kilometers away from Wilna. On 
that day 19 activists “confiscated” more than 200.000 rubles transported in a post train from 
Wilna to Saint Petersburg. The train raid left one Russian soldier killed and five seriously in­
jured. The stolen money was used to equip the militant and newly founded “Union of Active 
Struggle” (Związek Walki Czynnej). Cf.  JĘDRZEJEWICZ Piłsudski, pp. 41–43;  GARLICKI Józef Pił­
sudski, pp. 128–130; HEIN Piłsudski-Kult, p. 38; POBÓG-MALINOWSKI Akcja bojowa pod Bezdana­
mi;  ZAVARZIN Rabota taynoy politsii, pp. 459–462. – After 1905, politically motivated robberies 
on trains, banks, and other public institutions became “a source of constant concern for the 
[Tsarist] authorities“. GEIFMAN Thou Shalt Kill, p. 21. On the increasing number of armed train 
raids in Russia (in particular in the Caucasus): Zheleznodorozhnoe delo 18 (1899), no. 25–26, 
p. 228; 21 (1902), no. 2–3, pp. 31–32; no. 7, p. 80; no. 30–31, p. 300; no. 38–39, p. 380; 22  
(1903), no. 2–3, pp. 30–32; no. 15–16, p. 171; no. 19–20, p. 220; no. 13–14, p. 155; no. 24, p.  
259; no. 25, p. 268; no. 39–41, p. 431; no. 45, p. 494; no. 46–47, p. 512 etc.
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Shortly thereafter the police detained three male suspects – F. A. Borisov, M. P. Troitskiy 
and V. I. Kuntushev – who claimed to have only pursued a plan to smuggle illegal literat ­
ure from Geneva to Russia. But none of the suspects could explain why a sledgehammer 
was found by the authorities in their possession.
Historians have speculated about the goals of this group of militant political activists 
and the so-called “Elizavetgrad affair” in 1869. According to  PHILIP POMPER the suspects 
had been planning “something other than a plot to smuggle contraband literature.”16 Feo­
fan Borisov had been a member of Nicholas A. Ishutin’s socialist circle “Organisation.” 
Within the secret cell of this group (called “Hell”), the method for assassinating the Tsar  
described in the anonymous letter had been discussed.17 The other detainee, Mikhail Troit­
skiy,  subsequently joined the terrorist organisation “Narodnaya volya”  (People’s Will). 
Later the police found out that Sergei Nechaev, the author of the “Catechism of a Revolu­
tionary” and founder of the underground organisation “Narodnaya Rasprava”  (“People’s 
Reprisal”), had also been in the area where the three suspects were arrested. Nechaev had 
been seeking work on the railroad and had introduced himself in Odessa as a Serbian ma­
chinist. We also know that he had contacted the group of Borisov, Troitskii and Kuntu­
shev in September 1869. All these facts taken together suggest  that Tsar Alexander II  
luckily escaped a sophisticated bomb attempt on his train in the autumn of 1869 that had  
been planned by a group of revolutionary socialists.
Railroads appeared as an ideal target for attempts on the life of such high-ranking offi­
cials as the Russian Emperor for three reasons: First, terrorists understood that the net­
work of railway-lines was difficult for the authorities to control effectively and therefore 
offered an almost ideal site for attempts that needed long and complicated preparations. 
The fact that the Emperor’s train was also operated by night facilitated the work of the ter­
rorists under the cover of darkness. Second, the activists counted on the operation of trains 
according to schedules, allowing them to foresee the time of arrival of a train and to plan 
the destructive explosion a few minutes in advance. Finally,  the terrorists expected the 
train’s momentum to cause its derailment (if stopped at full speed) with the crash of the 
carriages, ‘hopefully’ injuring or killing the train’s passengers. Therefore, alongside dy­
namite, invented by Alfred Nobel in 1866, railroads seemed to be a new and useful item in 
the strategic arsenal of modern political terrorists.
* * *
Considerations of this kind likely inspired members of the executive committee of “Nar­
odnaya volya” when masterminding the abortive attempt of November 18‒19 1879 on the 
life of Alexander II during his return from his summer residence in Livadia in the Crimea 
to Moscow. Three different spots of the railway lines were targeted.18 Indeed, when the 
Executive Committee imposed its “death sentence” on Tsar Alexander II in August 1879, 
16 POMPER Sergey Nechaev, p. 98; POMPER Nechaev and Tsaricide.
17 VILENSKAYA Revolyutsionnoe podpol’e v Rossii, p. 413. On the foundation of the organization 
“Hell”: VENTURI Roots of Revolution, pp. 336f.
18 On the plots of November 18/19, 1879: Delo 1-go marta 1881 g., pp. 57–86, 97–99, 273–285, 
367–372; VENTURI Roots of Revolution, pp. 681–684; FIGNER Memoirs of a Revolutionist, p. 77. 
ULAM In the Name of the People, pp. 336ff.; VOLK Narodnaya volya, pp. 100–102.
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the conspirators decided that the best opportunity to attack the Emperor was precisely the 
time when he was moving by rail from one location to another.19 Whether the activists of 
“Narodnaya volya” were acquainted with the idea to attack the Emperor’s train developed 
by Polish national rebels and socialist revolutionaries of the 1860s remains unknown. In 
fact, by 1879, the implementation of such an attempt was still unprecedented in interna­
tional railway history.
Months before the expected journey of Alexander II from his summer residence in the 
Crimea to Saint Petersburg, the “People’s Will” had managed to install one of its mem­
bers as a ‘railway-guard’ near  Odessa and to rent houses located in proximity of rail­
way-lines near the village Aleksandrovsk in Ekaterinoslav guberniya and near Moscow.20 
Without raising any suspicion, the terrorists dug tunnels from their shelters to the railway 
tracks,  laid cables and installed galvanic batteries and explosive devices.  Despite these 
sophisticated preparations, none of the bombs hit the designated target. At the first spot 
near  Odessa,  the terrorists  left  their  hideout  before  the estimated train journey due to 
changes of the Emperor’s travel route. At Aleksandrovsk, a small town on the railway line 
between the Crimea and Khar’kov, Andrey Zhelyabov incorrectly joined the electrodes 
when the  Emperor’s  train  passed  above the  hidden  explosives  on  November  18.  The 
mechanism produced no spark, the bomb did not detonate and the Emperor’s train passed 
by without incident.21 At the third location on the Moscow‒Kursk Railroad, Stepan Shiri­
aev connected the electrodes correctly but only after the first of two illuminated trains had 
passed by.22 The assassins assumed that Alexander II would travel in the following train. 
In fact, the Emperor’s train and the train of his entourage had changed positions on their  
way to Moscow and the bomb consequently hit ‘only’ the servants’ train causing its de­
railment  but  without  seriously  injuring  its  passengers.  At  this  moment  the  Tsar  had 
already safely reached Moscow.
Although Alexander had once again survived an attempt on his life, the perpetrators 
were proud of their sophisticated action. Despite their failure to kill  the tsar, they had 
managed to derail one of his trains – a prominent symbol of the government’s project to  
modernize Russia in the era of the Great Reforms. Vera Figner, one of the members of the 
“People’s Will” who was involved in the preparations of the plot near Odessa, recalled in 
her memoirs: “With the help of chemistry and electricity the revolutionaries blew up the 
Emperor’s train.” Although the attempt was a ‘mishap,’ it nevertheless “produced an im­
mense impression in Russia, and found an echo throughout all Europe”.23 In their under­
19 Apparently the decision to attack Alexander II’s  train on its way from the Crimea to Saint  
Petersburg was taken on the clandestine meeting of “Narodnaya volya” in summer 1879 in  
Lipetsk. Iz spravki, pp. 90f. Cf. also: Delo 1-go marta 1881 g., pp. 246, 285, 342, 367; VENTURI 
Roots of Revolution, p. 681.
20 Vera Figner, who had joined the terrorist cell at Odessa, used her contacts to the city’s political  
establishment to get a position as railroad guard for her fellow combatant Mikhail Frolenko ali ­
as Semen Aleksandrov. FIGNER Memoirs, p. 79; VENTURI Roots of Revolution, p. 682.
21 Delo 1-go marta 1881 g., p. 99, p. 367; FIGNER Memoirs, p. 80; VENTURI Roots of Revolution, 
p. 682.
22 FIGNER Memoirs, p. 80.
23 FIGNER Memoirs, p. 80. In March 1881, Nikolay Kibal’chich, “Narodnaya volya’s” ‘technician’ 
and specialist for the construction of explosive devices, explained at court that due to the “in­
tensification of the government’s struggle with the party and regarding the fact, that [“Narod­
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ground newspaper the organization highlighted the  modern character of the attempt of 
November 19: In contrast to this attempt on the Emperor’s train, earlier assaults had been 
rather primitive. “A man with a revolver has always been confronting the ruler […] face 
to face. [The assassin] didn’t have a chance to escape and [his deed] was not likely to be 
successful.” How different were the circumstances of the attempt on the Emperor’s train 
in 1879: “The assault was thoroughly planned and prepared – a significant  amount of 
money, workforce and technical knowledge were applied.”24 Full of self-confidence the 
organisation boasted: 
“The increasing level of proficiency is for us a source of great satisfaction. […] The ‘self-edu­
cated persons’ adopted the best weapon systems and applied the latest and newest scientific  
and technological achievements. In all phases of their fight, the revolutionaries unintention­
ally recall the highest cultural race, pitting their strength against the numerous, wild hordes of 
the government. Knowledge and ingenuity are without any doubt on the side of the ‘half-edu­
cated’.”25
By contrast, ‘official’ (and censored) Russian newspapers were shocked by the new tac­
tics of the invisible revolutionary foe. Two days after the attempt Russkie vedomosti com­
mented: 
“Regarding the fighting methods applied, [the subversive elements] […] went a bold but hor­
rible step further. The weapons they traditionally used for their actions seem not to be suffi ­
cient any more. Daggers and pistols, which need a fanatic hand for one moment, have been 
thrown away because they have not produced the expected results. They were replaced by 
slow actions which demand both persistent tension and malevolent activities. From the sur­
face of the earth [the subversive elements] have disappeared to the underground and from 
there they pursue their destructive activities.”26 
When the news of the detonation near Moscow reached the Tsarist authorities, none of the 
officials  bearing  responsibility for  the security  of  the Emperor  wanted  to  believe that 
somebody might have dared to commit a terrorist act against the train of Alexander II. 27 
When Prince Dmitriy D. Obolenskiy, who had survived the plot of November 19 as one of 
the passengers in the train of the Emperor’s servants, rushed to Moscow immediately after 
the accident and delivered his report to the Minister of the Imperial Court, Count Adler­
berg, to the Chief of the “Third Section,” Adjutant General Drentel’n and to the General-
Governor of Moscow, Prince Dolgorukov, the high ranking officials refused to believe 
naya volya”] would have to make use of devices it had not used before, I decided to collect the 
respective manuals on technical and chemical  issues I needed for accomplishing this task.”  
Delo 1-go marta 1881 g., p. 88.
24 Narodnaya volya. Sotsial’no-revolyutsionnoe obozrenie, vol. 2, Nr. 3, 1.1.1880, p. 4.
25 Narodnaya volya. Sotsial’no-revolyutsionnoe obozrenie, vol. 2, Nr. 3, 1.1.1880, p. 5. – In 1882 
Sergey Stepnyak-Kravchinskiy,  who had murdered the  St Petersburg Chief of Police, N. V. 
Mezentsev; in 1878 and became one of “Narodnaya volya’s” prominent ‘spokesmen’ in West­
ern Europe after his escape from Russia, lauded the “Egyptian labours” of the Moscow mine 
(“raboty byli poistine egipetskie”) and stated that engineers later praised the tunnel near Mo­
scow as “extremely well made” (sdelan ochen’ khorosho). STEPNYAK-KRAVCHINSKIY Podpol’naya 
Rossiya, p. 115, p. 117; English translation: Underground Russia, pp. 156–157.
26 Russkie vedomosti, no. 294, 20.11.1879, p. 1. State attorney Nikolay V. Murav’ev argued sim­
ilarly in his bill of indictment on March 28 1881. Delo 1-go marta 1881 g., p. 285, p. 288.
27 Nabroski vospominaniy, pp. 272–273.
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that the train accident might have been caused by a terrorist plot.28 Count Adlerberg re­
portedly replied to Prince Obolenskiy’s  account:  “You know, human nerves  are often 
stressed after a [train] accident. Lie down and relax. After a good night’s rest everything  
will look differently.”29 But shortly after this conversation the officials had to acknow­
ledge that Obolenskiy had not made up the story of the bomb attempt on the Emperor’s 
train. (At this time they still did not know that the attempt on the Emperor’s train near 
Moscow was the third in a series of similar ambushes.) The events of November 18/19 
confronted the Tsarist regime with the fact that the kramola, the invisible terrorist enemy, 
had opened up a new chapter of political warfare, targeting the Emperor when he was 
travelling around the country and making use of the ‘blessings of modernity’,  like ni­
tro-glycerine and the railroads. Over the subsequent years, the security measures applied 
during the Emperor’s journeys on the Russian railroads were increasingly tightened. As 
we know, Alexander II only reluctantly accepted the new restrictions on his personal mo­
bility – a fact which undoubtedly helped the assassins of the “People’s Will” to kill the 
emperor while he rode in his carriage on March 1, 1881.30
The fortunate rescue of Tsar Alexander in November 1879 was interpreted and propag­
ated by court officials and conservative publicists as a sign of the grace of god who “again 
had  saved  the  precious  life  of  the Emperor”  (vnov’ spas dragotsennuyu zhizn’  Gosu­
darya).31 The authorities deliberately made use of the fact that Alexander II, after having 
reached Moscow in the first train, was praying in front of a miracle-working icon of the 
Mother of God at the moment when the bomb hit the servant’s train.32 This coincidence 
was presented to the public as a divine “miracle” (chudo) – proof of Alexander’s protec­
tion by Providence.33 When, one day later, the Emperor appeared in front of high-ranking 
officials in the Kremlin of Moscow, he stressed that “God once again saved Me and all 
people accompanying Myself.”34 After November 19, a painting was distributed in Saint 
Petersburg depicting the “miraculous” rescue of Alexander II: “You see a criminal hiding 
behind a wall in a lonesome house, watching attentively the first train approaching. Up in 
the sky there is an angel sheltering the carriage in the middle of train with his hands. The  
whole episode is shown in evening light. The bright signal lamps of the steam engine illu­
minate  the  angel  in  dazzling light.”35 Whereas  the  perpetrators  of  “Narodnaya  volya” 
stressed in their ‘reading’ of the event of November 19 the ‘modern’ character of their tac­
28 Nabroski vospominaniy, pp. 272f.
29 Nabroski vospominaniy, pp. 272. 
30 On the notion of security and its impact on the behavior of European heads of state in the 19th 
century: DIETZE/SCHENK Traditionelle Herrscher.
31 Sankt  Peterburgskie  vedomosti,  no. 321 (22.11.1879),  p.  1;  Rasskaz ochevidtsa,  p. 377. Cf. 
also:  MESHCHERSKIY Moi vospominaniya, p. 438; Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters, p. 83.
32 Moskovskie vedomosti,  no. 297 (21.11.1879), p. 2;  Sankt Peterburgskie  vedomosti,  no. 321 
(22.11.1879), p. 1; VON PFEIL UND KLEIN-ELLGUTH Das Ende Kaisers, p. 54.
33 Moskovskie vedomosti, Nr. 297 (21.11.1879), p. 2; Vestnik Evropy 14 (1879), no. 12, p. 857. 
The Minister of War, Dmitriy Milyutin, described the rescue in his diary as a “miracle“, too.  
Dnevnik D. A. Milyutina, vol. 3, p. 180.
34 Moskovskie vedomosti,  no. 297 (21.11.1879), p. 2;  Sankt Peterburgskie  vedomosti,  no. 321 
(22.11.1879), p. 1; Vestnik Evropy 14 (1879) no. 12, p. 858.
35 VON PFEIL UND KLEIN-ELLGUTH Das Ende Kaisers, p. 54.
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tics, the authorities, on the contrary, highlighted the Tsar’s protection by God and thereby 
referred to traditional and pre-modern interpretative patterns.
Rumours abounded that the Tsar had originally planned to travel in the second train 
that fell victim to the terrorist’s assault. According to this story, the Tsar had arrived earli ­
er than scheduled at the place of departure in Simferopol, thereby requiring the change in 
timetables of the imperial and the servants’ trains.36 This narration was well compatible 
with the story of Alexander’s rescue by Providence: God made his pious servant change 
the  prearranged  order,  he  intervened  in  the  laws  of  modern  life  and  the  rhythm  of 
timetables and thereby offset the modernist visions and technology-driven plans of the ter­
rorists. From the memoirs of Vera Figner and testimonies of other contemporaries,  we 
know that the ‘miraculous’ rescue of the Emperor’s life had rather profane reasons. In fact 
Alexander II had left Simferopol according to the timetable of the second train. Inform­
ants of “Narodnaya volya” sent the following message to Moscow by telegraph: “We ac­
companied grandmother this morning to the train. Please come and meet her. The price of 
wheat is 2 roubles, we charge 4 roubles [i.e. the Tsar is travelling in the fourth carriage of 
the second train.]”37 But on their way to Moscow both trains changed position, a fact the 
terrorists could not anticipate.
After the assault of November 19 the authorities and the conservative press made a 
strong effort to show, that the extremists bearing responsibility for the plot must not be re­
garded as representatives of the “ordinary” Russian people. Whereas the activists of “Nar­
odnaya  volya”  claimed to act  in the name of the “People’s Will,” official  propaganda 
stressed the deep divide between them an the pious and loyal Russian narod. On Novem­
ber 22, for example, “Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti” stated: 
“Such criminal acts [like the plot of November 19] go beyond the possibilities of imagination 
for the incorrupt, virgin fantasies of ordinary people […] [Such acts] would not have occurred 
if the idea of such a deed had come to the mind of the population. If someone told the inhabit­
ants of Moscow that somebody might have dug a tunnel underneath a railway track in order to 
explode a bomb when the Emperor’s train was passing by, every Russian would have gone to 
examine all houses and huts near the railway embankment and would have checked person­
ally that nothing threatens the tranquillity of the monarch.”38
Right after the abortive attempt on the life of Alexander II, the Russian press reported in  
detail about the background of the terrorist plot. Conservative journalists highlighted that 
the extremists had cowardly lied in ambush and thereby violated the rules of an ‘honest’ 
trial  of strength with the authorities.  When the house where Shiryaev  and Sofiya  Per­
ovskaya had waited for the arrival of the Emperor’s train was searched by the security 
forces, they found out that every item connected to the destructive mechanism had been 
properly camouflaged.39 Similarly,  the methods applied seemingly evidenced the cold-
blooded attitude of the radicals who had dug a 40-meter-long trench from the house to the 
36 Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti, no. 322 (23.11.1879), p. 1; Rasskaz ochevidtsa; Nabroski vos­
pominaniy, p. 270; Dnevnik D. A. Milyutina. 1878–1880, vol. 3, p. 179.
37 Nabroski vospominaniy, p. 271.
38 Sankt  Peterburgskie  vedomosti,  no.  321 (22.11.1879), p.  1. “Narodnaya  volya”,  in contrast, 
claimed that the news of the attempt on Alexander’s life was absorbed by the public in Moscow 
with apathy and coldness. Cf. VENTURI Roots of Revolution, p. 683.
39 Moskovskie vedomosti, no. 300 (25.11.1879), p. 3; Podrobnosti pokusheniya 19-go noyabrya; 
Rasskaz ochevidtsa, p. 378.
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railway track and installed a wire from their shelter to the mine underneath the embank­
ment of the railroad.40 Indeed, the journalist of “Novoe vremya” highlighted in his report 
that Shiryaev and Perovskaya had disguised their nocturnal activities by pretending to live 
a religious life during the daytime.41 By decorating their ‘home’ with holy icons they had 
pretended to be part of the pious neighbourhood where they took residence. Consequently, 
according to the officials’ reading, they violated the unwritten laws of the Russian com­
munity and alienated themselves from the ‘ordinary people.’ With some satisfaction the 
press thus reported that, once the police had finished their investigations at the site of the 
crime, an enraged mob of around 4,000 people gathered at the small house where the ter­
rorists had hidden and destroyed all windows and furniture shouting “hurray” as if they 
wanted to take personal revenge on those traitors who had pursued their deed from this 
“hated house” (nenavistnyy dom).42
* * *
Apart from being regarded by terrorists as a practically suitable and highly symbolic tar­
get for their militant activities, railroads served political activists working in conspiracy as 
an indispensable network for communication and transportation. The new means of trans­
portation had opened up new possibilities for radicals to move quickly around the empire 
and to leave the country in order to escape detention. Railroads also facilitated the founda­
tion of networks of clandestine terrorist cells in various cities and communications within 
these networks.43 Memoirs of activists from terrorist organisations like “Narodnaya volya” 
or  the “Combat Organization”  (Boevaya Organizatsiya)  of  the  Socialist  Revolutionary 
Party give ample evidence of the importance of trains for the flow of information and the 
transport of weapons, propaganda, dynamite,  money, instructions, etc.44 The authorities 
realised that this modern mode of transportation was used by the regime’s opponents and, 
therefore, they steadily intensified the control of suspicious passengers and their baggage 
at railway stations.45 When Grigoriy Gol’denberg, who was involved in the preparation of 
the abandoned plot against the Emperor’s train near Odessa, left the city in order to return  
some nitro-glycerine to Moscow, he was checked by security guards on November 14, 
1879 at the railway station of Elizavetgrad because his heavy suitcase had raised the sus­
picions of a porter.46 Though he tried to escape and defended himself with a revolver,  
Gol’denberg was arrested and later provided the police with detailed information about 
40 On the preparations of the plot:  VENTURI Roots of Revolution, p. 683; PRIBYLEVA-KORBA/FIGNER 
Narodovolets Aleksandr Dmitrievich Michaylov, p. 142.
41 Podrobnosti pokusheniya 19-go noyabrya, p. 2; Moskovskie vedomosti, no. 300 (25.11.1879).
42 Moskovskie vedomosti, no. 300 (25.11.1879), p. 3.
43 On the impact of the image of Russia’s network of railroads on Dostoevskiy’s novel “Demons”: 
LOUNSBERY Dostoevskii’s Geography.
44 Cf. for example: SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista.
45 KANTOR Ispoved’ Grigoriya Gol’denberga, p. 121;  PIPES Degaev Affair, p. 43;  Politicheskaya 
politsiya i politicheskiy terrorizm v Rossii, p. 84.
46 Politicheskaya politsiya i politicheskiy terrorizm v Rossii,  pp. 48–53, 84–93;  CROFT Nikolay 
Ivanovich Kibalchich, p. 67; VENTURI Roots of Revolution, p. 681; FIGNER Polnoe sobranie soch­




the underground activities of “Narodnaya volya”  and the persons involved in the plot of 
November 18/19.47
When the Chief of the “Third Section” was informed by officials in Elizavetgrad about 
the detention of a certain Stepan Efremov (alias Grigoriy Gol’denberg) and the confisca­
tion of more than 16 kilograms of explosives found in his baggage,  Adjutant General 
Drentel’n (who five days later pretended to be surprised by Obolenskiy’s report) left the 
following remark on the telegram: “Didn’t he prepare anything for the journey of the Em­
peror’s train?” (Ne k proezdu li imperatorskogo poezda on gotovil?)48 The director of the 
“Third Section,” Shmidt, even sent urgent telegrams to Simferopol, Ekaterinoslav, Khar’­
kov, Orel, Tula, Kaluga, Moscow, Tver’ and Novgorod warning the authorities on the spot 
of “a possible attempt on the Emperor’s train on its way from Livadia to Petersburg or on 
the train of the Tsarevich on its way from Petersburg to Moscow”.49 As we know, the 
alarming message did not mobilize the responsible agencies in a sufficient manner. Ap­
parently the idea that terrorists might try to blow up the Emperor’s train on its journey 
through “Holy Russia” still sounded to the ears of many Russian officials as too fantastic  
to be treated seriously.  It  took only a few days  until  these men had to recognize that 
Shmidt’s terrible vision had become reality.50
* * *
Railway stations could become a ‘mouse trap’ both for terrorists like Grigoriy Gol’den­
berg and for  high-ranking  Tsarist  officials  falling victim to new strategies  of  militant 
political warfare in the Tsarist Empire. Railroads were discovered by terrorists in Russia 
both as a target for attempts on the Emperor’s life and as an almost ideal site for assaults 
on the life of high ranking Tsarist officials. In 1904, during the “second wave of terror­
ism” in Russian history, members of the SR “Combat Organization” identified the square 
in front of the station of the Saint Petersburg-Warsaw railroad in the Russian capital as an 
appropriate site for their attempt on the life of the unpopular Minister of the Interior, Vy­
acheslav von Plehve. On 15 July 1904 von Plehve drove in his armoured carriage from his 
dacha on Aptekarskiy ostrov to the Baltic Station where he planned to embark on a train 
taking him to a meeting with Tsar Nicholas II at his summer palace in Peterhof. Plehve, 
who had already survived a number of attempts on his life, was killed when Egor Sazonov 
threw a bomb underneath the wheels of his carriage in front of the Warsaw railway sta­
tion.51 The square in front of the building proved to be an almost ideal site for a terrorist  
47 TROITSKIY Narodnaya volya pered tsarskim sudom, pp. 89–91.
48 KANTOR Ispoved’ Grigoriya Gol’denberga, p. 123.
49 KANTOR Ispoved’ Grigoriya Gol’denberga, p. 124.
50 Stepnyak-Kravchinskiy claimed that rumours  about the attempt  on the Emperor’s  train had 
“quickly spread throughout all Russia” (“bukval’no po vsey Rossii”) already before November  
19: “Every student, every barrister, every writer not in the pay of the police, knew that the ‘Im­
perial train would be blown up during the journey from the Crimea to St. Petersburg’. It was  
talked about ‘everywhere’, as the phrase runs. […] Yet the police knew nothing.”  STEPNYAK-
KRAVCHINSKIY Podpol’naya  Rossiya,  pp.  182–183,  English  translation:  Underground  Russia, 
p. 276. – This story was clearly part of the revolutionary’s wishful thinking that the “narod” and 
the “intelligentsiya” unanimously supported the terrorists’ mission.
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assault of this kind for several reasons. As Boris Savinkov, one of the conspirators in­
volved in the plot, recalled in his memoirs, 
“the plan was as follows: it was known that Plehve lived in the building of the Police Depart­
ment (Fontanka 16) and that every week he rode to the Winter Palace, Tsarskoe Selo, and  
Peterhof – depending on the time of year and the Tsar’s residence – to report to the Tsar. Be­
cause it was obviously more difficult to kill Plehve at his home it was decided to put him un­
der constant surveillance. The goal of this surveillance was to determine the exact day and  
hour, the route, and all of the apparent details of his trips to the Tsar. Based on this, we pro ­
posed to blow up his carriage with a bomb.”52 
After long and thorough observations of the minister’s itineraries in Saint Petersburg the 
perpetrators decided to make their attempt on a Thursday when von Plehve usually took 
the morning train to Tsarkoe Selo for his regular appointment with the Emperor.53 
In the morning of July 15 the Minister left his dacha, his coach was – as always – accom­
panied by agents of the  okhrannoe otdelenie. Von Plehve planned to take the 10 o’clock 
train to Peterhof at the Baltic Station and the terrorists anticipated that he “never came late to 
a meeting with the Tsar.”54 The fact that von Plehve had to reach his destination in time in 
order to reach his scheduled train helped the perpetrators plan their deed meticulously. They 
anticipated several locations and the exact time when the respective assassin could best hit 
his target. Savinkov’s memoirs illustrate impressively how and to what extent the terrorists 
had already anticipated a modern understanding of time55: “the transfer of the bombs was 
calculated by minutes (rasschitana po minutam). The lateness of one conspirator hampered 
the whole process and could even frustrate the chance of a successful attempt.”56 On July 8 
when an attempt to kill von Plehve failed because one of the perpetrators came late, Sa­
vinkov “nervously went forwards and backwards on the Peterhof avenue, but Sazonov was 
late. I looked at my watch, we mustn’t loose a minute. At this moment Shveytser appeared 
punctually at the arranged time […] I told him that we had no time to wait for Sazonov.”57
One week later, between eight and nine o’clock in the morning of July 15, two members 
of the SR conspiracy arrived by train at the Nikolay Station and two at the Warsaw Station 
where they were met by Savinkov. Egor Sazonov and Ivan Kalyaev had been at a clandes­
tine meeting in Vilna; David Boroshanskiy and Shimel’ Sikorskiy arrived from the city of 
Dvinsk. In Saint Petersburg each of the four terrorists was provided with a bomb and in­
structions when and where he was supposed to attack von Plehve on his way from his dacha 
to the Baltic Station. Egor Sazonov was expected to detonate the first bomb in front on the 
Warsaw Station, i.e. the neighbouring building of the Baltic Station (Fig. 1). Sazonov dis­
51 On von Plehve’s assassination: Niva. Illyustrirovannyy zhurnal literatury i sovremennoy zhizni, 
1904, no. 30, p. 600; SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, pp. 21–72; GEIFMAN Thou Shalt Kill, 
pp. 54–55, p. 279, n. 52; JUDGE Plehve, pp. 234–237. The event of July 15, 1904 inspired An­
drey Belyy when writing his famous novel “Peterburg”. Cf. PERI/EVANS Visions of Terror.
52 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 23. English translation quoted from: PERI/EVANS Visions 
of Terror.
53 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 51.
54 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 59.
55 On the notion of temporality and the history of modern terrorism cf. the article of Claudia Ver­
hoeven in this issue.
56 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 59.
57 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 59.
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guised himself as a railway employee in order to blend in to the surroundings of the railway 
stations, and Kalyaev was dressed as a porter: “The uniform of a railwayman minimized the 
risk of being accidentally arrested.”58 Busy traffic and crowds of people coming from and 
rushing to their trains gave Sazonov perfect shelter to approach von Plehve and to toss the 
explosive device underneath his carriage. The explosion immediately killed the Minister. 
Sazonov survived the attempt seriously injured. The proximity of the railways allowed the 
other conspirators to escape quickly from the scene of the crime. After assuring himself that 
the plot had been ‘successful,’ Kalyaev threw his bomb into a pond and left the city with the 
12 o’clock train to Kiev. Boroshanskiy likewise got rid of his explosive device and left Saint 
Petersburg by train. Savinkov, who read about von Plehve’s death in a special edition of a 
daily newspaper, boarded a train in the evening in order to report in Warsaw to Evno Azef, 
the head of the SR “Combat Organization,” about the group’s achievement.59
Railroads allowed the conspirators of the plot against von Plehve “to step on and off 
the staging ground for  the murder  and to  retreat  into the wings when necessary”  and 
thereby to lessen the risk of capture.60 The regularity of the minister’s itinerary, which was 
synchronized with the timetables of trains commuting between the capital and the Tsarist 
58 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 59. In a letter to his comrades written in custody Sazo­
nov explained that “in this costume (v ėtom kostyume) nobody took notice of me in between the 
masses of railwaymen passing by”. SAZONOV Materyaly dlya biografii, p. 9.
59 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 67, p. 73.
60 PERI/EVANS Visions of Terror.
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Fig. 1: The facade of the Warsaw railway station in St. Petersburg with broken windows  
after the assault on Vyacheslav von Plehve on July 15, 1904. The picture was taken by a  
professional  photographer  of  the  studio  “K.  Bulla”  and  published  in  the  illustrated  
magazine “Niva” on July 24, 1904.
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residences in Peterhof and Tsarskoe Selo, helped the terrorists to plan in detail and ‘on 
schedule.’ The gathering of passengers and railway employees in front of the station en­
abled Sazonov, disguised as a railwayman, to “disappear in the masses” (Sazonov izchez v  
tolpe)61 and to throw his bomb from this ‘shelter’ at the minister’s coach.  “Without this 
modern technology,  as  Peri  and Evans convincingly argue,  Azef’s plot  against  Plehve 
would not have been feasible.”62
The attempt on Vyacheslav von Plehve in July 1904 also illustrates a significant shift in 
tactics of underground warfare from the first  wave of Russian political  terrorism in the 
1870s to its second phase at the beginning of the  20th century. Whereas the activists of 
“Narodnaya volya” focussed their attention on the Tsar and identified his imperial train as a 
potential target of their assaults, attacks on low- and mid-level officials proliferated in the 
later period. In this context, moreover, crowded sites of public space like railway stations 
became ever more frequent arenas in which Socialist Revolutionaries  and other extremists 
challenged the Tsarist regime. – Another terrorist operation that fits into this picture was 
Mariya Spiridonova’s failed attempt on the life of the provincial counsellor Gavrila Luzhen­
ovskiy at the station of Borisoglebovsk in Tambov province on 16 January 1906.63 This 
“most famous terrorist act committed by a woman in the era of the first revolution”64 allows 
us to shed light on another dimension of how the railroads could be used by extremists as an 
instrument of terror.
As this article has emphasized, railroads were an important means of transportation and 
communication both for terrorists and for members of the Russian administration. Trains 
enabled officials to move quickly from one place to another and thereby to enhance con­
trol over the country’s vast territorial expanses.65 As the assassination of von Plehve illus­
trates, trains and railroad stations also turned out to be dangerous places for representat­
ives of the Tsarist elite. By definition “public spaces” (publichnye mesta), trains and rail­
way stations were accessible to everybody, populated and used by members of all social  
classes and consequently difficult to control.66 At the same time, trains and railroad plat­
forms can also be characterized as enclosed public spaces, segregated by walls and fences 
from the  exterior  and  thereby both offering  shelter  and  enclosing  people  inside.  This 
double nature of ‘openness’ and ‘closedness’ of railway-space played a pivotal role in the 
terrorist act of Mariya Spiridonova.
In her letter from the prison of Tambov, published in part by the liberal  newspaper 
“Rus’” on 12 February 1906, the 21-year-old member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
described  in  detail  how  she  had  prepared  and  ultimately  committed  the  attempt  on 
Luzhenkovskiy who was notorious for his suppression of peasant unrest during the revolu­
tion of 1905/06 in Tambov province.67 Luzhenovskiy, security chief of Borisoglebsk, one 
61 SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 65.
62 PERI / EVANS Visions of Terror.
63 BONIECE The Spiridonova Case.
64 BONIECE Spiridonova Case, p. 605. – On Spiridonova and her biography cf. also the article of 
Sally Boniece in this issue.
65 SCHENK Mastering Imperial Space?
66 “Public space encompasses: streets, squares, railroads and other roads, stations, rivers, embar­
caderos, canals, steamboats, trains, coaches, sites of public amusement, hotels, bars and other  
public institutions.” Prakticheskoe rukovodstvo, p. 49.
67 Pis’mo M. A. Spiridonovoy, in: BUDNITSKIY (ed.): Istoriya terrorizma v Rossii, p. 224–228.
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of the most unruly districts in these years, was moving around the area via railroad in his  
efforts to pacify the population. Spiridonova stalked her victim for several days as he trav­
elled around the Borisoglebsk district by train in order to identify the train in which he  
was travelling. Crowded railway stations offered a perfect surrounding for stakes-outs of 
this kind because the presence of an ordinary young woman did not attract the suspicion 
of the local security forces. One day she determined from the presence of Cossacks meet­
ing a train that Luzhenkovskiy was among its passengers. Spiridonova bought a second-
class ticket for the coach next to his. Dressed as a gymnasium student, she did not attract 
any suspicion.68 Once she had successfully entered Luzhenkovskiy’s  train, Spiridonova 
seized the chance that her victim could not escape the enclosed space of his railway car­
riage. When the train approached the station of Borisoglebovsk, she saw Cossacks and po­
lice driving people off the platform and deduced that this was done to prepare for Luzhen­
kovskiy’s arrival. She left her second-class carriage, entered the neighbouring coach and 
fired at her victim as he was stepping down from the train.69 In her letter from prison 
Spiridonova proudly announced that „Luzhenkovskiy was riding on that railroad for the 
last time.“70 The regional counsellor received a total of five wounds but survived the at­
tempt  seriously injured.  Notwithstanding the fact  that  Luzhenkovskiy was  met  on his 
point of destination by Cossacks and police, it had turned out to be impossible to protect  
him sufficiently on his trips on the railroads. In his case the railroad turned out to be a 
cage-like site of modern public space, sheltering an assassin and imprisoning his victim at  
the same time.
Spiridonova’s attempt on Luzhenovskiy is probably the best known but by far not the 
only terrorist assault at a high ranking official which took place inside the building of a 
Russian  railway  station.  On  13  August  1906  the  27-year-old  SR-activist  Zinaida  V. 
Konoplyannikova shot and killed General I. Min, the head of the renowned Semenovskiy 
regiment, on the platform of the railway station of Peterhof.71 Konoplyannikova rented a 
room in a house neighbouring General Min’s dacha from where she thoroughly observed 
her victim’s rhythm of life. In the evening of August 13, the General and his wife left their 
cottage for the railway station where they wanted to take the train to Saint Petersburg.  
Both were followed by Konoplyannikova who was equipped with a timetable of the Baltic 
Railways, a revolver and some books.72 When the General and his wife sat down on a 
bench on the platform, unprotected by any guard, the young terrorist approached them and 
shot several times in Min’s back. The General was seriously injured and died soon after­
wards. A large number of people were walking up and down the platform of the station 
when Konoplyannikova committed her deed. Like Spiridonova six months earlier at the 
station of Borisoglebsk, the young woman had not aroused any suspicion among the pub­
lic. Again the railway station was used by the perpetrator to act from the shelter of the 
68 On the relationship of modern terrorism and dress cf. article of Lynn Patyk in this issue.
69 BONIECE Spiridonova Case, p. 586.
70 Rus’, no. 27 (12.2.1906), quoted from BONIECE Spiridonova Case, p. 586.
71 On Zinaida Konoplyannikova:  KNIGHT Female terrorists, pp. 145–146; K delu Z. Konoplyan­
nikovoy; Delo Zinaidy Konoplyannikovoy, pp. 258–275.
72 Delo Zinaidy Konoplyannikovoy, p. 265.
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masses and to meet her victim at a place from which he could not escape. In August of 
that same year Konoplyannikova was sentenced to death and executed.73
* * *
Newspapers in Western Europe reported at length about the spread of terrorism in the 
Tsarist Empire in general and the first occurrence of railway terrorism in this country in 
particular.74 In light of the extensive publicity, it is likely that the targeting of arteries of 
communication and transportation in a modern society spread from Russia to Western 
Europe as early as the 1880s. In fact we find the first evidence of bomb attempts at rail ­
way facilities in Great Britain already in September 1880 when a deposit of explosives 
was found by a plate-layer underneath the track of the London and North Western Rail­
way about sixteen miles from London. Despite the fact that the bomb was discovered be­
fore it  could cause any harm, the railway company received instructions in November 
1880 from the Home Office and the Royal Household regarding special arrangements to 
be employed for Queen Victoria’s journey by the Royal Train at the end of the month.75 
Between 1883 and 1885 the population of London was shocked by a number of explo­
sions in trains of the city’s underground railway. The attacks were part of a campaign – 
known as the “Dynamite War” – by a group of Irish-American republicans called Fenians 
against the British government and high profile targets, particularly in London. “Clan na 
Gael,” a group of extreme Irish Republicans, deposited three bombs in or close to London 
Underground railway carriages full of passengers and left four more in the luggage offices 
of the London mainline railway terminal.76 Though nobody was killed during these bomb­
ings the number of indiscriminately insured passengers was significant. The strategy of 
73 Konoplyannikova was the first woman executed for a terrorist act since Perovskaya in 1881. I  
would like to thank Sally Boniece for bringing this fact to my attention. 
74 On the coverage of the attempt of November 19, 1879 in the Western press cf. for example Il­
lustrated London News, no. 2112, vol. LXXV (6.12.1879), p. 522;  Illustrierte Zeitung (Leip­
zig), Nr. 1902 (13.12.1879), S. 494.
75 The London & North Western Railway Society Journal 4 (2003–06), no. 3, pp. 94–95, no. 4, p. 
131. – On July 2, 1881 (N.S.) US President James Garfield was shot in a Washington railroad 
station by Charles Guiteau, an American lawyer who committed his crime without belonging to 
a terrorist organization. Garfield who was on his way to a summer’s retreat on the New Jersey 
seashore  was  seriously  injured  and  died  from  his  wounds  on  September  19,  1881  (N.S.)  
Guiteau was sentenced to death and hanged in June 1882. – On the reaction in the Russian press 
on Garfield’s assassination cf. for example Vsemirnaya illyustratsiya, no. 653 (1881), pp. 47–
50; no. 656, pp. 113. Guiteau’s deed which was not in the strict sense an act of modern political  
terrorism was harshly criticized by the Executive Committee of “Narodnaya volya.” In an open 
letter to the American people the Russian terrorists declared on 10 September 1881 that in the 
US, “a country where citizens are free to express their ideas […] political assassination is a 
manifestation of the spirit of despotism that we attempted to destroy in Russia”. Quoted in: 
NAIMARK Terrorism, p. 189; STEPNIAK Terrorism in Russia, p. 340. In a similar manner Russian 
SR activists at the beginning of the 20th century criticized anarchist terrorism “in the free coun ­
tries” (v svobodnykh stranakh) of Western Europe. SAVINKOV Vospominaniya terrorista, p. 83.
76 GRAY Irish Terrorism;  QUINAULT Underground Attacks;  JACKSON London’s Metropolitan Rail­




railway terrorism was also repeatedly applied in the early 20th century by revolutionary 
‘extremists’ in the Indian province of Bengal.77
To what extent these examples of railway terrorism outside Russia were related to the 
development of political violence in the Tsarist Empire needs further investigation. There 
is some evidence, however, that Russian terrorists were perceived by Western authorities 
as archetypes of internal political enemies and by militant political activists in the West as 
a source of inspiration. The British Home Secretary, Vernon Harcourt, who was in office 
during the “Dynamite War” of 1883‒85 and who introduced an “Explosive Bill,” banning 
the unlicensed possession of combustible substances, denounced the perpetrators of the 
London Underground explosions as “enemies of the human race” and compared them to 
Russian nihilists.78 Whether the Irish-American revolutionaries in the 1880s were copying 
the battle strategies of the “People’s Will” applied in November 1879 cannot be determ­
ined. In contrast, we do know that French anarchists collected press clippings reporting on 
the train-crash of  the Russian Emperor Alexander III  in October  1888 near  Khar’kov 
which, incidentally, was not the result of a terrorist attempt.79 One scholar recently stated 
that “techniques imported from Russia […] did have some influence on Indian terrorists 
involved in the freedom movement [after 1907].”80 But we do not have any evidence doc­
umenting that Indian revolutionaries of the early 20th century deliberately copied the Rus­
sian example when they identified railways as a target of their terrorist activities.
Apart from a number of similarities between the strategies applied by railway terrorists 
both inside and outside Russia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th century, 
one must also admit a significant difference between the methods of “Narodnaya volya” 
and the SR “Combat Organisation” analysed above and those of Western terrorist move­
ments at the end of the 19th century. Unlike Western anarchists and activists of militant 
movements of national liberation like the  Fenians, both “Narodnaya volya”  and the  So­
cialist Revolutionaries – in contrast as well to Russian anarchists – rejected terrorism tar­
geting randomly gathered people at  public places like cafés  or train stations.81 Though 
Russian terrorists from these organizations did tolerate the deaths of servants, guards and 
family members incidentally accompanying high ranking officials who had been “sen­
tenced to death,” activists of both “Narodnaya volya” and the SR Party regarded railway 
terrorism as a tool of assassination of distinctive individuals and not as a method of mass  
77 VON RÖLL Enzyklopädie des Eisenbahnwesens, p. 183–184. One of the first actions of this kind 
in  Bengal  was  the  attempt  to  blow up  the  train  carrying  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the 
province, Sir Andrew Fraser, on December 6th 1907. HEEHS Foreign Influences, p. 550; HEEHS 
The Bomb in Bengal, p. 121; CAMPBELL KER Political Trouble in India.
78 QUINAULT Underground Attacks, p. 19; CLUTTERBUCK Progenitors of Terrorism, p. 303. – On the 
impact of Russian terrorism of the 1870s–1880s on the development of terrorism in other coun­
tries: RAPOPORT Four Waves, p. 8.
79 KONI Krushenie tsarskogo poezda, p. 492.
80 HEEHS Foreign Influences, p. 553.
81 On the program of “Narodnaya volya” cf. for example:  MOROZOV Terroristic Struggle, p 149; 
The Basic Principles of the Program of the Union of Revolutionary Socialists (1900), in: MORO­
ZOV Terroristic Struggle, pp. 135–136, here p. 136; On the debates among SR activists about the 
legitimacy  of  killing  innocents:  SAVINKOV Vospominaniya  terrorista,  p.  83.  On  terrorist 
strategies of Russian anarchists at the beginning of the 20th century cf. the article of Anke Hil­
brenner in this volume.
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killing of innocent bystanders. From this perspective the examples of the terrorist acts of 
Bologoe, Madrid, London, and Mumbai at the beginning of the 21st century bear more re­
semblance to the militant activities of extreme Irish Republicans in London during the 
1880s than to the deeds of their Russian predecessors.82 
Nevertheless, the history of railway terrorism, which has not come to an end today, has 
its historical roots in the 1860s and 1870s in Imperial Russia. WALTER LAQUEUR and other 
experts on the history of political violence repeatedly label Tsarist Russia the “cradle of  
modern terrorism.”83 STEVEN MARKS recently portrayed “Narodnaya volya”  as the “proto­
type of virtually all subsequent terrorist groups in the world.”84 In fact the “People’s Will” 
was the first organization to use dynamite systematically as a destructive tool for their 
political warfare and to count on the resonance of their “Propaganda by Deed” in the na­
tional and international press.85 As it is demonstrated here, “Narodnaya volya”  was also 
the first violent group using railroads as a target for attempts on the life of prominent rep ­
resentatives of the political and social order they sought to destroy. They thereby laid the 
foundation for the tactics of modern railway terrorism.
* * *
In May 1883 the dynasty of the Romanovs lavishly celebrated the coronation of Tsar Al­
exander III in Moscow’s Kremlin. Among the high-ranking guests was the German am­
bassador to Saint Petersburg, General Hans Lothar von Schweinitz. In his memoirs the 
Prussian diplomat recalls the festivities of Alexander’s coronation as follows: 
“The celebrations of Moscow recollect in their scope similar events in the era of the Roman  
and the Byzantine Empires. We can’t find anything similar in history and hopefully we won’t 
have to encounter rituals like this again in the future. Imperial celebrations, like those staged  
[in the Middle Ages] by Friedrich Barbarossa in the lowlands of the Rhine, were wonderful  
when the monarch was surrounded by [an assembly of] knights – but they are just monstrous 
in the era of railroads and nihilists.”86 
82 Lindsay Clutterbuck convincingly argues in his Progenitors of Terrorism that Irish “perpetrat­
ors were reckless or careless to the potential loss of innocent life or at worst, they considered it  
of little or no consequence to their objective. For all these reasons there is a strong case to de ­
clare that the form of terrorism that came to dominate the latter half of the twentieth century 
originated with the campaign of terrorism launched by the extreme Irish nationalists.” In their 
acceptance of the loss of innocent lives they “differ markedly from […] the Russian revolution­
aries”. CLUTTERBUCK Progenitors of Terrorism, p. 305–307.
83 LAQUEUR Terrorism, p. 11; CHALIAND/BLIN The Invention of Modern Terror, p. 111;  VERHOEVEN 
The Odd Man Karakozov, pp. 4–5, 176. David Rapoport claims that “modern terror began in  
Russia in the 1880s and within a decade appeared in Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia.”  
RAPOPORT Four Waves, p. 3. Clutterbuck in contrast argues that it was the movement of extreme  
Irish Republicans in the late 19th century, not the Russian revolutionary movement, “that so 
many of the concepts, strategy, tactics and techniques of terrorism as it manifested itself in the  
twentieth century originated.” CLUTTERBUCK Progenitors of Terrorism, p. 314.
84 MARKS How Russia Shaped the Modern World, p. 16; Cf.  also:  PIPES Degaev Affair,  p. 10; 
GEIFMAN Terrorism.
85 On terrorism and modern mass communication: RAPOPORT Four Waves, p. 5.
86 Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters, p. 230.
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The German ambassador was obviously struck by the preservation of medieval rituals at 
the Russian court which – from his point of view – contradicted the rapid process of mod­
ernisation the country was undergoing. Schweinitz did not, of course, use the term “mod­
ernity” to describe the new era he and his contemporaries were experiencing. Yet he did 
refer to two outstanding signifiers of the new epoch: the railroads and “nihilism” – a term 
used by him and others as a synonym for contemporary political terrorism. The railways  
and terrorism were conceptualized by the diplomat as two sides of the same coin, as signi­
fiers of what we call today the ambivalence of ‘modernity.’
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Summary
Attacking the Empire’s Achilles Heels: Railroads and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia
 
This article analyzes the development of terrorist strategies that focused on sites of modern infra ­
structure both in Imperial Russia and in other countries at the end of the 19th and the beginning of  
the 20th centuries. It argues that the construction of railroads not only enabled a significant increase  
of geographical mobility and economic development in the 19th and 20th centuries, thereby contrib­
uting to the integration of national and trans-national spaces. This new means of transportation must 
also be regarded as one of the prerequisites for the development and spread of modern terrorism. 
The article reveals that the history of railway terrorism, which has not come to an end today, has its  
historical roots in the 1860s and 1870s in Imperial Russia.
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